With the advance of online social networks, the screening of applicants during hiring can extend beyond the usual application material. Although browsing the online pro…le of an applicant raises ethical issues, this practice potentially improves the job matching, at virtually no cost to the employer. In this paper, we investigate the use of online social networks as a reliable source of information for recruiters on applicants in the French job market.
Introduction
For a decade, Social Network Sites (SNSs) have been growing in popularity and have reached more than one billion users worldwide. 1 They radically changed the way many people create and manage relationships with friends and families. However, the impact of these online services seems to extend This paper was presented at the Telecom ParisTech Economics & Management Seminar (January, 2013), the Université Paris-Est Créteil seminar (January, 2013), the Economics & Psychology seminar at Paris School of Economics (March, 2013) , the 3rd SEEK Conference on Labour Market at ZEW Mannheim (April, 2013), the 11th IIOC Annual Conference in Boston (May, 2013), the Workshop on Experimental Economics in Florence (May, 2013), the 4th Annual Meeting of the French Experimental Economics Association in Mannheim (June, 2013), the 62nd Annual Meeting of the French Economic Association in Aix-en-Provence (June, 2013), the World Meeting of the Economic Science Association in Zurich (July, 2013) and we thank the audience for their comments and feedback. We are grateful to participants in the research program Alain Rallet, Fabrice Rochelandet, Fabrice Le Guel and Grazia Cecere for their useful comments all along the experiment, and also to Guillaume Hollard and José de Sousa for their support. Authors' e-mails: serge.pajak@u-psud.fr (corresponding author), matthieu.manant@u-psud.fr, nicolas.soulie@u-psud.fr. 1 See for instance BBC: http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-19816709 much further, with the media regularly reporting employee dismissals motivated by information disclosed on social network pro…les. 2 Moreover, many declarative surveys document the use of SNSs as sources of information on applicants by employers (Clark and Roberts, 2010) . As SNSs become ubiquitous, the use by employers of information not originally aimed at them raises ethical and economic issues. It demonstrates an increasing overlap of the professional and private spheres which could have a impact on the functioning and e¢ciency of the labor market. In this context, this study contributes to the debate on privacy regulation and addresses the following question: Do online SNSs constitute a reliable new source of information on applicants for recruiters? In other words, do recruiters screen applicants' SNS pro…les and use this information in deciding to grant or deny an interview?
The hiring process is the central labor market mechanism and is crucial for the e¢ciency of the economy. The better the match between an employer and an applicant, the higher will be the employee's productivity (Autor, 2001 ). However, the economic literature shows that hiring is plagued by search costs and incomplete bilateral information between employers and applicants (Stigler, 1962; Spence, 1973) . As a consequence, both players implement search and signaling strategies to …nd the best match (Rees, 1966; Salop, 1973a Salop, , 1973b Spence, 1973; Holzer, 1987) . Although there is a large literature on applicants' search and signaling strategies (Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999a) , work on the similar strategies of employers is scarcer (Granovetter, 1995; DeVaro, 2008; Oyer and Schae¤er, 2011) . Employers play a central role in the functioning of the labor market and the job matching process since applicants accept almost all job o¤ers (Barron et al., 1997) . The literature on employers deals mainly with two types of employer search strategies: extensive vs. intensive, and sequential vs. non-sequential screening (Holzer, 1987 ; Barron et al., 1997) . These search strategies could be implemented using formal or informal search methods (Rees, 1966 ; Albrecht and van Ours, 2006; van Ommeren and Russo, 2014). These two methods are associated with two main sources of information for recruiters: the formal application material (resume, cover letter, etc.), and the informal referrals and word-of-mouth. A recent trend in work on employers' search strategies investigates the use of SNSs in hiring (Clark and Roberts, 2010; Acquisti and Fong, 2013) . Our paper aims to extend the work on employers' search strategies, and to focus more speci…cally on SNSs as a reliable new channel of information on applicants during hiring, in addition to application material and referrals.
So far, evidence on the use of SNSs by employers relies on declarative surveys whose results show strong variation (see Clark and Roberts (2010) for examples). These variations could stem in part from the qualitative nature of these surveys (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001 ) and in part from the fact that using personal information during hiring is illegal, meaning respondents might be reluctant to truthfully answer questions about their hiring practices. To avoid declarative bias, we opt for a …eld experiment methodology 3 and create two …ctitious applicants with identical resumes and application cover letters but one di¤erence in their Facebook pro…les. While the control applicant has a typically French pro…le, the test applicant's Facebook pro…le reveals Marrakesh to be his hometown and Arabic a spoken language. This signal appears only on the Facebook pro…le. We chose this signal because the literature on labor market discrimination shows that this characteristic negatively a¤ects an applicant's call-back rate (Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) for the U.S.; Duguet et al. 2005 Duguet et al. , 2010 ; Jacquemet et al., 2012 for France). Each applicant has a unique …rst-name and last-name combination to ensure that an employer searching the applicant on the Internet …nds the right pro…le. The applicants' …rst names were chosen from among the most frequent French-sounding names for males of the applicants' age. Our candidates then apply for job openings for an accountant in the greater Paris area. In the usual testing methodology, two applications for a job opening are sent simultaneously and the resumes and cover letters of the two …ctitious applicants are su¢ciently di¤erent to avoid detection by the employer (this approach is called systematic attribution). In our case, the two applicants have identical resumes and cover letters and di¤er only in their name for identi…cation, and their Facebook pro…le for treatment manipulation. Therefore, we send one application per job opening using the pseudo-random attribution method (see Ahmed et al., 2013; Acquisti and Fong, 2013) . With this method, we control during the experiment that the two …ctitious candidates are applying for similar job positions. Following the literature on hiring, we consider a call-back from the recruiter to set up a job interview as a positive outcome. Since the two applicants are similar except for the Facebook pro…le displaying their hometown and languages spoken, a signi…cant di¤erence in call-back rate can stem only from observation by the employer of the signal that is available exclusively on the applicants' Facebook pro…les. 4 From March 2012 to March 2013, we sent more than 800 applications, evenly divided between the two applicants. The response rates for our …ctitious applicants are signi…cantly di¤erent, at respectively 12.2% and 16.9% for the control candidate. This suggests that employers search for additional information on the applicant to the application package submitted by e-mail, and use the information found on the Facebook pro…le to select an applicant for a job interview. In addition to this …rst result, during the experiment we observed an exogenous change in the layout of the Facebook pro…le. Information on the languages spoken by the applicant, instead of being displayed in the front page of the pro…le was pushed back into a tab. This change provided evidence on the depth of employers' search for personal information. Shortly after this layout change, which reduced the di¤erentiating signal, the gap between the callback rates of two candidates reduced dramatically, suggesting that the search for further information on the candidate is not deep and that employers limit it to the front page of the online social network pro…le.
This article is organized as follows. The …rst section reviews the job search literature with a special focus on employer's strategies, and presents our main hypothesis. The second section presents the …eld experiment and our protocol and the third presents the results of the …eld experiment. The …nal section o¤ers some conclusions.
Literature review
The hiring process is usually characterized with search costs and bilateral information asymmetries (Stigler, 1962; Spence, 1973; Salop and Salop, 1976) . In this context, applicants and recruiters aim at reducing these costs and asymmetries by implementing signalling and/or search strategies, reinforcing the importance of information. These strategies have been extensively studied in the case of job seekers. 5 In contrast, employers' strategies have been far less explored despite their importance in the hiring process. In this article, we focus on employers' search strategies, and especially on their evolutions with the Internet. 6 The literature on recruiters highlights the use of two main search strategies: extensive/intensive and sequential/non-sequential, depending on the number of screened applicants and whether the selection process is carried out continuously or sequentially (Rees, 1966; Barron et al., 1985) . These strategies could be implemented through formal or informal search methods (Rees, 1966, Albrecht and van Ours, 2006; van Ommeren and Russo, 2014) . Formal method refers to the use of advertisements in newspaper or employment agency, whereas informal method draws on recruiters social network. These search methods imply that recruiters use two di¤erent support/channel of information about applicants with application materials in the case of formal method (Rees, 1966) , and referrals and word-of-mouth for informal methods (Granovetter, 1995) . More recently, the spread of the Internet and development of online social networks has had a strong impact on employers' strategies and potentially provides a new channel of transmission of information via online pro…les on SNSs.
Employers' search strategies
The literature on the employers' search strategies during hiring is more recent and rather scarce (Granovetter, 1995; DeVaro, 2008; Oyer and Schae¤er, 2011) . 7 According to this literature, employers can choose between extensive search, i.e. search on a pool of applicants as large as possible, and/or intensive search, i.e. search for additional information on selected applicants (Rees, 1966; Barron et al., 1985; Holzer, 1987) . Barron et al. (1985) use data such as average number of hours per applicant for recruiting, to provide evidence of the existence of such strategies. More recent work highlights an important feature of these search strategies, i.e. whether or not search is sequential. The model proposed by Burdett and Cunningham (1998) considers search to be sequential if the …rm o¤ers a job position to an applicant immediately after receipt of her application and assuming the applicant's productivity exceeds a certain threshold. If the applicant accepts the position the search process stops. Conversely, non-sequential search assumes that the …rm pools a certain number of applications and then screens them, and …nally o¤ers the position to the best applicant. Empirical studies using vacancy characteristics (required education, work experience, etc.), investigate the determinants of search strategies. They show that both extensive and intensive strategies can be optimal depending on characteristics such as job seekers' strategies, vacancy duration, job characteristics, etc. (van Ommeren and Russo, 2014). However, in most of these studies, the nature of the dependent variable, namely vacancy duration, makes interpretation of the results di¢cult. Andrews et al. (2008) point out that a short (long) vacancy duration cannot be exactly interpreted as a sequential (non-sequential) search strategy. According to van Ommeren and Russo (2014), empirical studies highlight a strong relationship between search strategies (sequential or non sequential) and search methods (advertising, private or public agency, etc.).
Employers' search methods and channels of transmission of information
These search strategies could be implemented using formal or informal search methods (Rees, 1966;  Albrecht and van Ours, 2006; van Ommeren and Russo, 2014). Formal search methods refer to the use by recruiters of advertisements and employment agency to …ll a position. Informal search methods rely on information gathered or received by recruiters from their social network (friends, relatives, current or incumbent personnel, etc.). In the case of formal methods, the information consists in the application material (resume, cover letter, etc.) directly or indirectly (via e.g. employment agency) provided by the applicant (Rees, 1966) . In the informal method, recruiters gather or receive information through referrals and word-of-mouth from friends, relatives or former/current employees (Albrecht and van Ours, 2006). In other words, each type of method is associated with a particular channel of information.
Formal information channels include the basic application material screened by employers to select applicants, i.e. cover letters and resumes. The information provided consists mainly of objectively veri…able information such as education, work experience, quali…cations, etc. Employers can screen these documents and contact previous employers and/or school heads. During interview, if required for the position advertised, the employer may have the opportunity to carry out additional checks such as medical examination, credit worthiness, police record, etc. (Rees, 1966; Spence, 1973; Holzer, 1987; DeVaro, 2008) .
Informal information channels include information acquired from former colleagues and/or friends of the applicant through referrals and word-of-mouth (Rees, 1966; Granovetter, 1995; Montgomery, 1992 , Albrecht and van Ours, 2006; van Ommeren and Russo, 2008). According to Rees (1966) , former or current good employees are considered by employers as reliable channels of information about potential recruits for two main reasons. First, employers anticipate that employees tend to recommend candidates with similar competences and location. Second, employees know that their referrals can impact their own reputation. As a result they tend to recommend people who they think will be most appropriate. Furthermore, applicants who have been recommended for a position by a friend or a relative tend to be more con…dent in the information provided about the position (type of work, working atmosphere, boss's behaviors, etc.). Consequently, such applicants are more able to assess whether their competences are a good …t with the position. The empirical literature underlines the complex e¤ects of informal contacts and networks on labor outcomes due to individual, relational and employer heterogeneity (see Ionnides and Loury (2004) for a review). Since the work of Rees (1966) and Granovetter (1995) , many studies highlight the importance of referrals and recommendations in hiring. More recent studies using newly available data (DeVaro, 2008) show that informal channels of information matter as they carry reliable information that could only with di¢culty spread through formal channels.
SNSs as a new source of information for recruiters?
The labor market is being heavily impacted by the advance of the Internet. Employers bene…t from lower costs for advertising job openings and applicants face lower costs in searching for relevant job openings and sending applications. Overall, lower costs are expected to increase the e¢ciency of the labor market by improving the quality of employee-employer matching (Autor, 2001; Manning, 2011) . 8 However, Autor (2001) points out that the ease of application for job seekers can result in excessive irrelevant applications which may increase employers' cost of selection. As a consequence of the overload of formal and standardized application information, employers may turn to informal information on applicants to narrow their search.
In addition to easier access to formal information on applicants, the Internet also provides new sources of information on applicants: their SNSs pro…les. The wide use of SNSs is making it easy for employers to check background information about applicant (schools, current and former positions, etc.), but also to access personal information not dedicated to them (trips, friends, hobbies, opinions, etc.). In this way, SNSs constitute a new informal source of information in addition to referrals and word-of-mouth. Unlike these sources of information, interaction with others is not required in the case of SNSs. Recruiters can check online pro…les without the applicant's awareness or consent. Evidence of such practices among recruiters has been recently underlined in the literature through declarative surveys (Clark and Roberts, 2010) or …eld experiment on online discrimination (Acquisti and Fong, 2013) . This privacy concern raises ethical and economic issues.
Most notably, there is an important discrepancy between the intent of SNSs users and that of employers. The former tend to use SNSs casually as a tool for social interaction, including recreational purposes, while the latter use them to gather personal information on applicants with direct professional consequences. This di¤erence in the use of personal information may harm the quality of the relationship between employers and employees (Clark and Roberts, 2010) . Incidentally, this new hiring practice is an illustration of the shifting boundaries between the personal and professional spheres. On an economic viewpoint, personal information disclosed online may constitute a relevant determinant of hiring decision. Apart from Acquisti and Fong (2013) for the U.S. labor market, how secondary usage of personal information impacts matching during hiring has been neglected in the literature. Following this recent strand, our paper tests whether SNSs has become a new reliable informal source of information for recruiters on applicants (see Figure 1 ). The most direct way to establish use of social media in hiring is asking employers. However, there is a strong declarative bias due to the legal/ethical nature of the question. To circumvent this, we set up a …eld experiment.
Field experiments have been used in the literature to capture employers' hiring practices. They rely upon two main methodologies: situation (or audit) testing, 9 and correspondence testing. The audit approach allows to focus on employers' hiring behaviors along the multiple steps of the hiring process, i.e. i) whether they recall the candidate for an interview, ii) whether they o¤er the position after the interview, and iii) the wage level o¤ered. The …rst audit testing was conducted by Daniel (1968) . 10 One of the limitations of this approach is that it is di¢cult in practice to ensure similarity of applicants' performance during a face-to-face interview. Moreover, the actor's direct interaction with the employer during the interview raises strong concerns of experimenter bias (see Bertrand and Mullainathan 2004 for further discussion).
Correspondence testing involves fewer methodological issues (Riach and Rich, 2002) . It allows for a higher level of control over the experimental environment, especially the content of applications. It is also less time-consuming (Bursell, 2007) , and easier to rigorously reproduce. According to Bursell (2007) , correspondence testing is a type of randomized experiment, 11 and therefore provides the strongest possible opportunity to draw causal inferences. The main di¢culty lies in making the applications similar in all relevant aspects, so that only the tested characteristic varies between the two applications. Last, although correspondence testing reveals discrimination at the call-back stage and not at the …nal hiring decision stage, it has been shown that around 90% of the discrimination occurs at the call-back stage (Riach and Rich, 2002) . Therefore, we choose to carry out a correspondence test. However, unlike usual correspondence tests where recruiters receive at least two …ctitious applications, we send one application per job 9 Audit testing consists in real persons briefed by the experimenters, usually professional actors, applying for the opening and presenting themselves to the job interview. They then act in a similar manner for every interview. The characteristics of the actors or the way they behave during the interview can thus be manipulated all other things equal. opening with quasi-identical applicants. We created two …ctitious applicants with identical application material (resumes and cover letters) except for one manipulated characteristic or signal. This approach has two main advantages. First, the two applicants are identical in term of competence and experience which drastically limits potential compounds. Second, as a consequence, each recruiter receives only one application. This means that the study only marginally in ‡uences the hiring process (compared to sending multiple applications per opening) which is desirable from an ethical view point and in terms of e¢ciency. Third, as the applications are sent to two separate samples of …rms, the detection risk is non-existent. We therefore need to insure that the two applicants apply for similar positions in terms of job and …rm characteristics. We do this by using job openings from the French public employment agency that provide detailed information on both the position and the …rm. This point is developed in the following protocol description.
Signal
In our experiment, the di¤erence between the two applicants consists in an Arabic signal on one applicant's Facebook pro…le. The Arabic pro…le mentions that the applicant is from a Moroccan city (Marrakesh), and speaks Arabic. The control pro…le is from a French city (Brive-la-Gaillarde) and speaks Italian. We thus di¤erentiate our applicants by city of origin and language spoken as displayed on the Facebook pro…le.
The literature highlights the importance of an applicant's foreign origins (see e.g. Duguet et al., 2010 for applicants from the Paris area) and language skills for potential employers during hiring (Oreopoulos, 2009; Edo et al., 2013) . Therefore, provided the signal is perceived, it can be expected to have a negative impact on the odds of being called back.
The literature shows that, within the application package, information triggering employer rejection can be conveyed by the applicant's name, especially her foreign origin ( (Weichselbaumer, 2003; Drydakis, 2009 ), or the photograph attached to the resume (Weichselbaumer, 2003) . However, manipulating those signals is not a suitable strategy in our case since information on names and hobbies is included in the resume and could not be evidence that the employer consulted the online pro…le.
Ahmed and Hammarstedt (2008) use the Internet as a medium to test for discriminatory practices related to rental housing ads posted online. However, as in every preceding study, the discriminating information is contained in the application package. In our study, the application is completely similar for the two …ctitious candidates, and the Internet is the medium for both transmission of the application (by the candidate) and discovery of discriminating information (by the recruiter).
Resumes, cover letters and Facebook pro…les
For each applicant, on both the resume and the cover letter we indicate the following information, in order: name, address, holding of a driving license, date of birth and age, phone number and email address. The applicant's address is in an a-uent Paris district (15th arrondissement) to avoid location-based discrimination. The applicant holds a driving license. The phone numbers are distinct in each resume so as to track candidates' call back. The e-mail address of each applicant is registered on Gmail with user name following the same pattern "…rstname.lastname@gmail.com". Names and dates of birth are also available on the Facebook pro…les.
In our base resume, the applicant has a three-year higher education degree in accounting, a ‡awless school record, and three internships with various experience suitable for most accounting jobs. A cover letter is included in the application. A cover letter that is too general and standardized is usually not su¢cient; employers usually seek a speci…c professional pro…le (customers, suppliers, asset management, etc.). We pre-de…ned parts of the letter with standard sentences corresponding to the common pro…les sought by recruiters, and included them according to what was speci…ed in the ad.
We used information on the recruiting …rm that was available on the Internet, such as o¢cial websites, web articles, etc. If we were unable to …nd information about the …rm, we sent an unspeci…c cover letters. Resumes and cover letters were submitted as pdf …les. Pdf is a standard format that is easily readable by recruiters. Before the start of the experiment and alongside conducting pre-tests, we interviewed human resources managers to ensure relevance of the cover letters to current job market conditions.
The …rst and last names of each applicant are French-sounding. The …rst names were picked from the top-…ve …rst names for the year of birth. Each combination of …rst name and last name is unique, and our …ctitious pro…les are the sole results when searching on these …rst and last names on the three leading French language web search engines, and on Facebook. 12 Each combination corresponds to one unique Facebook pro…le. To test that the results do not depend on the speci…c names or work experience of the …rst pair, we create a second pair of applicants with di¤erent names and with fewer work experience. 
Selecting the job openings
We selected the job openings published by the French public agency for employment, Pôle Emploi (PE), during the period March, 2012 to March, 2013. Only job openings posted through the PE public agency website are collected; other recruitment channels, such as Monster, are not considered. We focus on PE openings for two main reasons: First, PE systematically provides detailed information on the job (wage, contract, working hours, required education and work experience, etc.) and the …rm (name, location, sector, size, etc.) which is crucial for pseudo-random attribution of applicants to job o¤ers. Other popular French employment websites (Monster, Keljob, Indeed, etc.) provide much less detail except in the case of a few job ads. Second, since PE is the public employment agency it has a transparent equal opportunities policy and discriminatory employers will likely avoid posting their openings on the PE website. Auto-selection of employers using this recruitment channel is thus likely to make it more di¢cult to …nd a signi…cant di¤erence between the two candidates. The applications are submitted via a standard email referring to the advertised position and the reference number, with the resume and cover letter as attachments. 13 We selected only openings that provided the recruiter's direct contact information (contact name and e-mail), and excluded those which required the applicant to contact a third-party, usually PE or a recruitment agency. Only openings for relatively long-term contracts were considered, i.e. jobs with an unde…ned-duration work contract (CDI) or a …xed-duration contract (CDD) of 6 months or more. 14 Our applicants have three years of undergraduate education in accounting, and we responded to ads in the three relevant categories (accountant, assistant-accountant, and aid-accountant) in the PE categorization. For each selected opening, we generate the application material, i.e. the resume and the cover letter, using pre-de…ned key sentences to match advertised job. At this point, to avoid experimenter bias, the material was not assigned to an applicant. Assignment to an applicant occurred only after all the application material had been generated.
Pseudo-Random Assignment Procedure
We observe the recruiters' behavior through the di¤erences (if any) in return rates for the two …ctitious applicants. The candidates have identical application packages and di¤er only in selected information on their Facebook pro…les. Following Ahmed et al. (2013) and Acquisti and Fong (2013), we use a pseudo-random assignment procedure where only one application is sent per job o¤er. The type of applicant is pseudo-randomly assigned to each application, so that all along the experiment similar job o¤ers are attributed to each applicant. 15 Half of our sample of job openings receives an application from the control candidate and the other half from the Arabic candidates. The traditional systematic assignment procedure provides information on how a given employer responds to every candidate who applied. However, we are interested in showing that employers that received an application from the control candidate called him back for interview more often, on average, than employers who received the Arabic candidate. We control that this systematic di¤erence is not due to …rm or job characteristics. In addition, when using a testing approach the experimenter needs to construct two …ctitious candidates who are su¢ciently di¤erent to avoid detection but close enough that the di¤erence in call backs between the two candidates can be attributable only to the factor of interest, and not to other factors which were changed to di¤erentiate the two candidates. The random assignment procedure requires that the number of applications is doubled but completely alleviates the trade-o¤ between the risk of candidates being detected and the ability to interpret the results. As our candidates never both apply to the same company, the risk of detection is considerably lower than with a usual testing methodology. And since we do not need to di¤erentiate the candidates arti…cially to avoid detection, we can o¤er strictly identical candidates.
Results

Experiment overview
The experiment covers a period of one year from March 19, 2012 to March 19, 2013 . During this period, we sent a total of 837 applications. As shown in Figure 2 , we sent applications for both candidates at similar rates over the period. The vertical red line indicates the time when we changed to the second pair of …ctitious applicants (names, work experience and Facebook pro…les), as discussed in the previous section.
Samples balancing Since we send one application per opening, our database is divided into two samples, …rms that received the control candidate and …rms that received the test candidate. We ensured that the two samples were balanced in relation to …rms' observable characteristics by using pseudo-random sampling. Table 2 below presents the descriptive statistics for the job positions and …rms applied to. 16 We observe that, on average, both applicants applied to similar positions in terms of jobs and …rm characteristics. During the whole experiment our applicants received 122 positive recalls for interview. This global return rate is quite high (14.6%) compared to other similar studies (see e.g. Duguet A few chose contact by both phone and e-mail (5.7%). All the applicants' postal addresses were real, but no regular mail was ever received. Table 3 shows the overall results of the …eld experiment. Table 3 and Figure 3 show a signi…cantly lower call-back rate for the test candidate (12.2%) compared to the control (16.9%). 17 A Chi2 test indicates that this di¤erence is signi…cant (Chi2 statistics=3.67; Pr=0.055). This result validates our hypothesis that recruiters screen the Facebook pro…les of our applicants and used the information available on these pro…les when deciding whether to call our applicants back for interview. Robustness checks of this result are provided in Annex 2 which also includes time dummies and control variables in Table 2 .
Variable of interest
The three robustness checks in Annex 2 con…rm the signi…cant negative impact of the Arabic signal available on the online pro…le, on the probability of being invited for interview. 18 Models 2 and 3 which include additional control variables show that some also have a signi…cant in ‡uence on the likelihood of a positive outcome.
Control variables
The control variables which turn out to be signi…cant highlight additional results about the hiring process generally. Firstly, we observe a negative impact of over-education on the probability of being selected. Secondly, during the experiment the applicants' work experience ranged from 1 to 13 months. It appears that only a large di¤erence between applicant's current work experience and that required by recruiters is an impediment. Only four or …ve years of experience di¤erent from what the recruiter requires seems to negatively a¤ect the odds of call-back. Thirdly, we noticed a negative non-linear e¤ect of distance from the job. Close commuting distances (30-90 minutes) have a negative in ‡uence on the probability to be selected, but longer distances (over 90 minutes) and shorter (under 30 minutes) have no signi…cant impact, suggesting that employers would expect the successful applicant to relocate closer rather than endure a long commute (van Ommeren et al., 1999). Finally, only three sectors have signi…cant e¤ects, namely industry, teaching/research, and hotel/restaurant. One possible explanation for this is that although we designed the applicants' resumes to …t as many industries as possible, they do not …t all activities. The activities of teaching and research use very speci…c public accounting beyond the scope of our applicants' skills and education.
Exogenous layout change On December, 2012 Facebook changed the layout of its pro…les, 19 from a single page to a front page which includes tabs to provide access to certain personal information. Such personal information, which used to be directly available in the …rst page of the pro…le, is now available only if viewers click on the relevant tab. Speci…cally, the new pro…les provide information on city of origin on the front page but information on language(s) is accessed by clicking the 'About' tab. Other aspects of the experimental setting remained unchanged. Comparing the results before and after the layout modi…cation allows us to isolate the impact, if any, of this ergonomic change on the economic outcome. The period from March, 2012 to December, 2012 allows us to establish our main result: a Facebook pro…le provides recruiters with a reliable source of information on applicants. 20 The second period from December, 2012 to March, 2013 provides some evidence about the depth of the screening performed by recruiters within the online pro…les. We discuss the results of these consecutive parts of the experiment below.
Note: The second pair of applicants graduated in September 2012 and therefore have less work experience. See table and …gure in Annex 13 for the details of the di¤erences between the two pairs of applicants.
First part of the experiment The …rst two applicants were used during the 6.5 months from March 19, 2012 to September 30, 2012. The two applicants have work experience ranging from 6.5 months at the beginning of this part to 13 months at the end (see Annex 13 for more details on the experiment timing). During this period we sent a total of 462 applications. Table 4 and Figure 4 below summarize the results during this …rst period: not surprising as the wage o¤ered is related to the required education level and to other job characteristics such as the required experience, the sector, the job position and the …rm size among others. Once we exclude "mean wage" in the model 3, the condition index fall down to 20.4. 1 9 Link to the o¢cial announcement of the Facebook layout change: http://newsroom.fb.com/News/584/ Improvements-to-Timeline]. Table 4 : Call-back statistics of the …rst two applicants
The …rst part of the experiment shows a consistent gap in the number of call-backs received by our two applicants. In particular, Figure 4 shows a roughly constant gap of 8 percentage points between the two applicants in favor of the control candidate who received 21.3% of positive returns compared to 13.4% for the test candidate. A Chi2 test con…rms the signi…cance of this di¤erence (Chi2 statistics=5.09; Pr=0.024). 21 Based on the experimental protocol in place, this gap favoring the control candidate can result only from two joint choices of employers: i) screening of applicants' Facebook pro…les, and ii) exploitation of the information collected from these pro…les to decide whether or not to recall the candidate. Incidentally, the fact that employers use the information obtained from Facebook suggests also that it is considered reliable although not part of the formal application package. It appears that the content of the online pro…le seems to carry important weight for the decision to call back.
Second part of the experiment
The second pair of …ctitious applicants was used during 5.5 months from October 1, 2012 to March 19, 2013 . In this case, the two applicants' work experience ranged from 1 month at the beginning of this part to 6.5 months at the end. During this period we sent a total of 375 applications. Table 5 and Figure 5 summarize the results of this second part: Table 5 : Call-back statistics of the second two applicants 2 1 Information on the similarity of the applications during this period and additional robustness checks for this result are available respectively in Annexes 3, 4 and 5. Table 5 and Figure 5 show that both applicants had similar call-back rates (11.6% and 10.8%) at the end of the second part of the experiment. These callback rates are lower than those in the …rst part of the experiment, which was expected since the applicants have shorter work experience. The two call-back rates are not signi…cantly di¤erent (Chi2 statistics=0.05; Pr=0.81), which leads us to conclude that our two applicants are no longer di¤erent from the recruiters' point of view.
The second part of the experiment from October, 2012 to March, 2013 is usefully divided into two sub-periods: before and after December 2012, when the Facebook layout changed. Table 6 summarizes the main results of the two sub-periods: Table 6 : Call-back statistics of the last two applicants by sub-periods
During the …rst two months of the second part with the new applicants (new names and graduation dates), we again observe an 8-percentage point gap in call back rates between the control (16.0%) and the test (7.1%) candidates. A Chi2 test indicates the signi…cance of this di¤erence at the 10% threshold (Chi2 statistics=2.84; Pr=0.092). In other words, during the …rst eight months of the experiment the gap between the two types of applicants remained fairly constant, and highlighted the use of online pro…les in employers' selection processes.
In December 2012 we observe a decreased gap between our applicant pairs. During the last 4 months of the experiment, the test candidate has a call-back rate that is not statistically di¤erent from that of the control applicant, respectively 13.0% and 8.3% (Chi2 statistics=1.34; Pr=0.24). After 8 months characterized by a constant gap in call-backs between the two applicants, the Facebook layout changed and the gap shrank. After the change, our results suggest that both applicants are similar from the point of view of employers. Since the strength of the Arabic signal on the test Facebook pro…le was reduced by the layout change, distinguishing the two applicants would require deeper browsing of pro…les. Our result is con…rmed by other studies on discrimination showing that language skill concerns are a strong element of job discrimination (Oreopoulos, 2009; Edo et al., 2013) . 22 This part of the experiment is thus consistent with search behavior which does not involves very thorough screening by employers of applicants' SNS pro…les and reliance only on the front page. More study is required to characterize this behavior further. For instance, the applicants' education level in our experiment is three years undergraduate study; it remains to be seen whether more senior jobs would involve more thorough SNS pro…le screening.
Conclusion
This study aimed at extending the relatively scarce literature on recruiters' search strategies. We investigate the potential use of SNSs, in our case Facebook, as a reliable source of information about applicants for recruiters during hiring. So far, the literature has focused only on the usual sources of information on applicants (application material and referrals). Declarative surveys on the use of SNSs in hiring are a¤ected by a strong declarative bias due to the ethical and legal issues surrounding the collection of applicants' personal data. We therefore set up a …eld experiment, using real job o¤ers for accountants in the greater Paris area. This experiment consisted of creating two …ctitious applicants that di¤ered only in their perceived origins, observable solely on their Facebook pro…le. In line with the literature on discrimination, this signal -if observed and considered reliable -is expected to have a signi…cant negative e¤ect on the call-back rates of the test applicant compared to the control. Conversely, if recruiters do not screen applicants' Facebook pro…le, the quasi-similarity of their application material (resume and cover letter) will lead to similar call-back rates for both. During 12 months (from March 2012 to March 2013), we applied for job openings for accountants in the Paris region using pseudo-random assignment method, and sent more than 400 applications per applicant.
The results show a signi…cant gap between the test and control applicants, with respectively 12.2% and 16.9% of positive returns. During the course of the experiment, a change in the standard Facebook layout sent information on the language to a sub-page, not directly visible from the front page. The extra step of clicking a tab to access that information allowed us to measure the depth of the recruiter's search. Therefore, the experiment is split into two sub periods -before and after the Facebook layout change in December 2012. The …rst sub-period from March 2012 to December 2012 shows a clear and consistent gap of 8 percentage points between the control (21.3%) and test (13.4%) applicants. The experimental protocol ensures that the signi…cant di¤erence results from observation of the Arabic signal available on the test applicant's Facebook pro…le. The main result of this article is that SNSs are used in hiring to screen applicants and do a¤ect the employer's decision to grant an interview.
The second part of the experiment is based on an unexpected change in the layout of Facebook pro…les which occurred in December, 2012. This modi…cation strongly a¤ected the Arabic signal as only a part of it (i.e. the hometown) still appeared on the Facebook front page, while the second part (i.e. language spoken) was positioned at the bottom of a secondary page (in the "About" tab). This natural experiment allowed us to learn more about the SNS screening practices of recruiters since, following this change the two candidates exhibited no signi…cant di¤erence in their call-back rates. It suggests that screening is super…cial, illustrating the existence of search costs for employers to browse an entire pro…le.
An implication for policy is that applicants should know that their SNSs pro…les are considered reliable means of assessment and selection by many recruiters. It is important during a job search to treat the SNS pro…le as a part of the application material. A communication campaign could be organized to inform people of the secondary use of their personal information and the potential consequences for the probability of …nding a job and for their professional careers. Our …ndings also suggest potential solutions, ranging from locking one's pro…le, to cleaning one's SNS pro…le during job search or various assessment periods, to the use of multiple SNS pro…les ("o¢cial" accessible to anyone, and private), to the use of an avatar. However, the impact of not having an online presence while looking for a job should be assessed in further studies.
It should be noted that the layout change leading to a signi…cant gap in call-back rates was minor. However, it changed the assessment of our applicants and the …nal economic outcome quite dramatically. Indeed, this type of recruiter behavior demonstrates the increasing overlap between the personal and professional spheres. Robust standard errors in brackets. +, ** and *** mean respectively signi…cant at 10%, 5% and 1% tresholds. * indicates a signi…cant di¤erence in mean or proportion between the two applicants at 5% threshold.
Annexe 1. Job applications by sector and applicant's type
Note: Given the large number of variables taken into account, some di¤erences between the two applicants could appear among control variables for sub-period of the experimentation. For instance, we can observe signi…cant proportion or mean di¤erences between the two applicants in the Table below for contract type, application delay and some job positions. For some extent, these di¤erences stem from the detailed manner we opted to expose the variables. In a less detailed way and without loss of relevance, all accounting assistant positions could be merged (accounting assistant, accounting and secretary assistant, and, other accounting assistant), and then the proportion di¤erence would not hold any more. In the case of contract type, the di¤erence is not due to a detailed manner to present this variable but to our pseudo-random assignment method during which we focus more especially on 4 characteristics: …rm's size and sector in addition to job position and required work experience. Then, some di¤erences could temporally appear among other control variables. For application delay, some di¤erence could appear due to the fact that at least two co-authors are involved in the preparation 2 3 French standard weekly worktime = 35h 2 4 Number of business days between the ad publication and the application sending and checking of the application materials. For each applicant type, the sending is carried only by one co-author. Depending on authors' availability, this last operation could imply some variations in application sending. According to models in Annex 5, the type of contract duration and the application delay have not however any signi…cant in ‡uence on the outcome of the application. * indicates a signi…cant di¤erence in mean or proportion between the two applicants at 5% threshold.
Note: in the Table below, we can notice again some di¤erences in proportion for some job positions and contract type. For job positions, these di¤erences do not hold anymore if we consider all accounting assistant positions together. Concerning contract type, this is the opposite case as in the …rst part of the experiment (see Annex 3). According to models in Annex 9, both job characteristics have not any signi…cant in ‡uence on the outcome of the application. * indicates a signi…cant di¤erence in mean or proportion between the two applicants at 5% threshold.
Note: Proportion equality tests are not satis…ed for one sector (hotel/restaurant) and one area (Val-de-Marne). However, these two …rm characteristics have no signi…cant in ‡uence on the outcome of application according to Annex 8. Robust standard errors in brackets. +, ** and *** mean respectively signi…cant at 10%, 5% and 1% tresholds.
Note: some sectors have to be merged due to perfect predictability of results otherwise. This is the case here for: construction and real estate, retail trade and hotel/restaurant, and industry, energy, waste and transport. * indicates a signi…cant di¤erence in mean or proportion between the two applicants at 5% threshold.
Note: signi…cant di¤erence in proportion or mean for the …rst sub-period, namely for contract type, application delay, one education level and one …rm size can be observed. Given the shortness of this unexpected sub-period, this type of di¤erence might be inevitable. However, it applied to only a few variables that have no signi…cant in ‡uence on the outcome of applications according to Annex 10 and 11. ref.
----Account., secretary and other assist. Robust standard errors in brackets. +, ** and *** mean respectively signi…cant at 10%, 5% and 1% tresholds.
Note: some sectors have to be merged due to perfect predictability of results otherwise. This is the case here for: construction and real estate; retail trade and hotel/restaurant; public organization, research/teaching and culture/leisure; personal services and bank/insurance, and, industry, energy, waste and transport. 
